



PRIO

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Institutt for fredsforskning

Chr. Michelsen Institute

Development Studies and Human Rights



Conflict and Development: Framework for a Proposed Research Area

Prepared by CMI and PRIO
March 2003

Nils Petter Gleditsch, Are Knudsen, Astri Suhrke & Henrik Urdal

Contents

1.	Introduction	1
2.	Clarification of terms	2
3.	Basic perspectives on the relationship between development and conflict	3
4.	Frontiers of research	6
5.	Current research in Norwegian institutions in this area	13
6.	References	15

Conflict and Development: Framework for a proposed research area

Prepared by CMI and PRIO
31 March 2003

1. Introduction

Supporting economic and social development, promoting good governance and reducing poverty worldwide are longstanding priorities in Norway's foreign policy. More recently, conflict resolution and peacebuilding have also become major Norwegian concerns. The two issues are closely interrelated. Armed conflicts and wars often suspend or reverse development. Moreover, less-developed countries are more likely to experience internal conflict than richer and more highly developed ones, and developed countries are more likely to undertake armed interventions than poorer states. This report addresses the mutual relationship between development and conflict and suggests future avenues of policy-relevant research. Such efforts can potentially contribute to increase the effectiveness of Norwegian support for development as well as peacebuilding.

The relationship between violent conflict and development has long been central to the social sciences. Classical theorists like Karl Marx and Max Weber framed this relationship on the level of state and society, and contemporary social scientists have approached these issues with a view to advancing basic research as well as policy-relevant knowledge. There are several reasons for refocusing on these fundamental issues today.

There is widespread agreement on a statistical relationship between underdevelopment and internal, armed conflict. Yet, the causal mechanisms linking the two remain contested or poorly understood. The Norwegian research community should be able to contribute constructively to the international debate about these issues.

Developments in the 1990s encouraged new research in areas that can inform the relationship between development and conflict. This includes recent work on democratization, community-driven development, the poverty–conflict trap, and the political economy of the 'new wars' of the 1990s. Anthropologists have studied the dynamics of violence and patterns of recruitment at the micro-level. The conflictual consequences of globalization and strategies of peacebuilding are increasingly being explored.

The number of on-going wars has increased for most of the period since World War II and armed conflict remains a major international problem.¹ In addition to the direct battle-deaths, armed conflicts carry large economic and humanitarian costs. After the end of the

¹ We use 'war' here for all armed conflicts although in much of the literature this term is limited to larger armed conflicts (usually with more than 1,000 battle-deaths). The Uppsala University Conflict Data Project defines armed conflict as the use of armed force between two organized parties (where at least one is a government) resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths. For the most recent update (1946–2001), see Gleditsch et al. (2002). In 2001, there was one interstate armed conflict and 33 internal armed conflicts in 27 different countries. Other compilations of current conflicts (Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Schreiber, 2002) use slightly different definitions and may show somewhat higher or lower numbers of conflicts in a given year. But the trend over time and the geographical distribution are very similar.

Cold War the number of armed conflicts has decreased in the world as a whole, but some regions have been left unaffected by this trend. In addition to traditional armed conflicts between states and within states some countries also experience other forms of violence, such as large-scale violent repression (including genocidal acts), terrorism, and armed intervention. Such forms of violence are also a matter of grave concern, and some of them are at least as poorly understood as regular wars between organized groups.

The post-Cold War international system has profoundly affected the conditions within and among states that affect both development and conflict. Development issues are increasingly shaped by the broad process of globalization. An upsurge of apparent ethnic conflicts in the 1990s became the subject of collective, international response rather than competitive intervention, as typically happened during the Cold War. The related claim that armed intervention could be a 'midwife of development' gained ground, and has recently been revived in the context of the Iraq crisis. In historical perspective it seems that conflict in fact did serve to sweep aside structural obstacles to economic and political reform in many parts of the Third World that had experienced violence during the Cold War.

At the same time, global concern with development and conflict has placed these issues at the forefront of the policy agenda of many states. There is impatience with older theories of modernization, which implied that development simply emerged as a result of evolving conditions rather than through policy intervention, and increased demand for knowledge that explores the role for countries and international institutions in bringing about desired changes. Thus, for reasons of methods, substance and policy, a case can be made for refocusing on the contemporary forms of the relationship between development and conflict.

2. Clarification of terms

We understand 'development' to have many dimensions. Economic development refers to the improvement of the standard of living of the population at large, typically including growth and poverty reduction. Some measures of economic progress take little account of a skewed distribution, and for that reason measures of economic equality are also taken into account. Social development includes demographic changes, such as the reduction of infant mortality and the increase in life expectancy, measures that unlike GDP per capita are not highly inflated by a small number of extremely high values. The term political development is used to refer to the emergence of an effective state that is responsive and responsible to its people, typically by means of democratic governance and the emergence of an active civil society. In this report, we use development in this broad, multidimensional sense of the word. There is an ambiguity in that the term development is used to refer to a state of affairs as well as a process of change. We try to clarify this by referring whenever appropriate to a given level of development versus the process and rate of change.

We use 'conflict' to describe collective physical violence in a wide range of different forms. In addition to wars and lower levels of violent conflict behavior between and within states, we include violent riots and rebellions, terrorist acts, genocide, and systematic repression. This broad concept of violence permits the comparison of causes and consequences of different kinds of violence, as well as their interrelationship. Thus, we argue the case for a broad examination of the role of such violence in the development process. For instance, the state may deliberately use violence in order to extract compliance by generating a 'culture of fear and terror' (Margold, 1999), or coercive measures of a disciplinary nature, such as forceful re-settlement (Scott, 1998). Some countries exhibit several forms of violence in succession or even in parallel fashion. For instance, since 1945 Indonesia has experienced a

war of independence, a civil war, expansionist wars, revolts, massive pogroms, and systematic violence associated with what some call a criminalization of the state (Anderson, 2001). During the same period, Indonesia has undergone a dramatic transformation, with rapid but uneven economic development interspersed with periods of recession, and experienced different forms of political systems. Exploring the relationship between such aspects of development and the various forms of violence could in itself be a major research focus.

3. Perspectives on the relationship between development and conflict

Is underdevelopment in itself a cause of internal conflict? Or is violent conflict rather a product of the development process, caused by *changes* in the economic, social and political structures? What is the relationship between different levels of development and interstate conflict? Is violent conflict necessarily bad for development, or are there cases where conflict may accelerate processes of change? This section will discuss four basic perspectives on the relationship between development and conflict: (i) Development as an inherently conflictual process, (ii) Underdevelopment as a cause of conflict, (iii) The developmental costs of conflict, and (iv) Conflict as a catalyst for development and peacebuilding.

(i) Development as an inherently conflictual process

In many parts of the world, violent conflict has been an integral part of the development process. State formation in Europe from the middle ages and onward was intimately associated with war-making, both through internal pacification and against adversaries more clearly defined as external. The modern state has its origin in the necessity of kings to regularize taxation and borrowing in order to consolidate their military power, and to provide predictable and low-cost protection to their subjects (Tilly, 1985; Giddens, 1992). Max Weber considered the military as the prototype of the modern, rational bureaucratic entity, and during the Cold War, many Western social scientists considered the military to be the pre-eminent modernizing agent in the Third World. In the perspective of classic Marxian political economy, development is likewise and necessarily conflictual, driven by contradictions inherent in the modes of production.

But there is a difference between potential and actual violent conflict, and some forms of development are less conflictual than other. In the development of Western states and society, historic compromises that decreased socio-economic inequality and established institutions allowing widespread political participation served to tame the potential for conflict. In line with this, modernization theory has frequently focused on institution-building. As Huntington claimed in a classic study (1968), institutions are essential to channel the conflicts inherent in the development process into non-violent political forms.

Much scholarship suggests that economic inequality generally exacerbates the potential for violence (Gurr, 1970; Stewart, 1998). The traditional literature on war and revolution established the importance of inequality, e.g. in the civil wars that challenged the oligarchies of Central America as well as in the older revolutions of Asia and Europe, and in patterns of landownership in relation to violent independence struggles in Africa (Gurr et al., 1991; Paige, 1975; Scott, 1976; Skocpol, 1979; Wolf, 1969; Zolberg et al., 1989). The point is contested, however (Lichbach, 1989), and recent quantitative work has failed to find any significant statistical relationship between economic inequality and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Hegre et al., 2003). This work, in turn, has been contested on methodological

grounds. Less controversial is the proposition that conflict is reduced when economic and ethnic boundaries do not coincide to reinforce each other, but form ‘un-ranked hierarchies’ (Horowitz, 1985).

Considerable recent scholarship has focused on the resource-intensive aspect of modern development and examined the implications for violent conflict. While some of this work is in a neo-Malthusian tradition, other focuses on broader patterns of conflict driven by competition for resources (Gleditsch et al., 1997; Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Le Billon, 2001).

More recently, a ‘resource curse’ school of thought (Sachs and Warner, 2001) has argued that countries with abundant and valuable natural resources, particularly minerals and oil, are likely to experience conflict over the control of revenues from these resources (de Soysa, 2002a,b). Both the scarcity and abundance perspectives are strongly linked to the role of economic development in the causation of conflict.

Generally, periods of change and transitions are associated with conflict. Change is likely to be uneven and create a sense of relative deprivation, injustice and threats among segments of the population that will lead to new forms of political protest or mobilization (Gurr, 1970). In cultural terms, modernization may create anxiety and contradictions, as noted by classical sociologists like Durkheim, and stimulate radical, collectivist responses as well as individual crises. Millenarian revolts of earlier periods are a case in point. At the same time, existing controls are likely to break down or are altered in the process of change. In this perspective, it is not surprising that recent studies have found that semi-democracies – countries that are somewhere between autocracy and democracy – are politically less stable and more prone to internal armed conflict than more pure types of autocracies and democracies (Hegre et al., 2001; Regan and Henderson, 2002).

Contemporary forms of transition that may be particularly relevant to the study of conflict are transitions from tradition to modernity, which have been associated with the rise of militant movements, transitions from a command economy to a market economy, transitions generated by growing globalization, transitions caused by demand for stabilization and structural adjustment reforms, and transitions from various forms of authoritarian regimes to democratic pluralism.

(ii) Underdevelopment as a cause of conflict

Classical writers envisaged development as a stable and peaceful end-point. Weber saw modernization as modifying what we today would call ethnic identities and conflict associated with them. The Marxian historical trajectory also ended in social harmony. A similar notion appears in recent macro-sociology of history that shows the transition from violence to stability of Western democracies, for instance in the work of Barrington Moore (1967). In this perspective, by implication, a state of underdevelopment is seen as a cause of conflict.

Recent quantitative research confirms that violent conflict is most likely to occur within and between poor and economically stagnant states. This is a near-universal finding in statistical studies (Hegre et al., 2001; Sambanis, 2002; World Bank, 2003), and supported by many case studies (Hauge, 2002).

Underdevelopment is also associated with complex emergencies, a term used to denote a broad class of frequently overlapping events like warfare, state violence, disease, hunger and displacement. Such events have been associated with long-term economic decline, but also factors like internal income inequality, dependence on IMF funding, and endogenous conflict tradition (Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002).

A similar relationship is found for political development. Violent conflict is less likely to occur within and among democratic states (Hegre et al., 2001; Russett and Oneal, 2001).

The reasons why democracies are internally peaceful and externally peaceful against each other remain contested. Western democracies appear to be involved in war as much as other countries (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997). Democracies have fought many colonial wars (Ravlo et al., 2003) and engaged in covert actions against radical regimes in the Third World. The United States has conducted particularly frequent military interventions in Latin America and France has intervened a number of times in its former colonies in Africa. After the end of the Cold War, the US is the only country that retains a global capacity for military intervention. Armed interventions by democracies are typically undertaken in, or against, countries that are economically less developed and that lack democratic institutions. Given the historical propensity of such states to go to war against non-democratic states, the reasons are not obviously found in the nature of democracy (Gates et al., 1996).

The older literature on imperialism and neo-imperialism found the causes of neo-colonialism and armed intervention in the nature of development within the industrialized, democratic states, and the fact of uneven economic development internationally. There is a large case-oriented literature on each type of wars in which the Western industrial democracies have been involved: the older imperialist wars and interventions, the interventions in Third World conflicts that became linked to the Cold War, and the interventionist wars of the 1990s and beyond. Recent works in this area are typically more sensitive to complex causal dynamics than the older neo-Marxist interpretations, including *inter alia* ideology as a motive force for intervention, whether of the national ‘manifest destiny’ type (Zimmermann, 2002) or contemporary understanding of human rights (Chandler, 2002).

The relationship between level of economic development and conflict may be contingent on level of political development, and vice versa. Newbury (1988) argues that very low levels of economic development may underwrite stable societies, particularly if they are non-democratic, in a pattern she labels ‘the cohesion of oppression’. Lipset (1959), on the other hand, argues that a certain level of economic development is a precondition for the emergence of a stable democracy. Some recent empirical evidence indicates that some economic development may also be necessary before we observe the peacebuilding effect of democracy. Autocratic governments rich in oil or other natural resources may be able to pay off the population in general and alternative elites in particular (Ross, 2001). However, rich autocracies seem to be more prone to conflict than rich democracies.

(iii) The developmental costs of conflict

Violent conflict entails destruction of life, health, property, infrastructure, and institutions. These losses can result in great losses in terms of economic, social, and political development.² This is perhaps the most widespread and intuitively understood connection between development and conflict. In more systemic terms, war can be understood as a factor of underdevelopment. The consequences of war in terms of the socio-economic development process have been systematically studied in at least one major project (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001) and in much of the case study literature. Increasingly, it has also attracted the attention of the World Bank.

² It is estimated that between 1945 and 2000, some 50 million persons, including civilians and military, have been direct casualties of armed conflict. Young men between the ages of 15 and 44 are by far the largest group of victims from conflicts; this is also a cohort that in economic development terms are highly productive. There are additional indirect effects on mortality through morbidity, lack of medical facilities, etc (Murray et al., 2002).

(iv) Conflict as a catalyst for development and peacebuilding

While having obvious costs, wars of national liberation, revolutions, civil wars, and military interventions may also address some underlying source of conflict and pave the way for institutional change associated with economic and political development. In recent years, this problematique has been the backdrop for the discussion of peacebuilding strategies, especially in post-conflict situations. A new literature has developed on how strategies of peacebuilding can promote economic and political development in war-torn societies. Most recently, the notion of ‘war as a midwife of development’ has been part of the rationale for armed intervention – either to address issues of human rights and promote political development through democratic self-determination (e.g. Kosovo, East Timor) or to introduce more progressive forms of development (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq).

4. Frontiers of research

Within this broad canvas, where are the current frontiers of research that are most relevant to Norwegian research institutions? We have applied the following criteria to define priority areas of research:

- where existing knowledge has produced puzzles to be explained or resolved
- where different methodologies tend to produce contrasting findings
- where knowledge can be advanced by building cumulatively on earlier findings
- where current events demand new policy-relevant knowledge
- where new areas have been identified by other research communities

This suggests several areas of research regarding the relationships between conflict and development. Here, we follow the same four-part division as in the previous section.

(i) Development as an inherently conflictual process

The world is undergoing a process of extraordinary rapid economic and technological change. As noted above, such transition periods are particularly prone to generate violence, and the process of globalization is often linked to conflict. The skeptics view globalization as resulting in greater inequality, insecurity, and pockets of poverty, factors that can in turn are likely increase conflict. Supporters of globalization, on the other hand, argue that greater economic exchange between states creates interdependence and economic growth, and enhances democracy – all of which increase the cost of conflict and reduce the risk that it will occur within or between states. These opposing perspectives need to be confronted more systematically through research. Quite possibly, both may have elements of truth at the same time.

There is need for more systematic knowledge regarding the consequences of globalization with respect to conflict. Globalization needs to be ‘unpacked’ in terms of its various components and their impact on various types of societies as well as segments within. Conditions under which the conflictual aspects of globalization can be modified need to be explored.

Globalization has spurred new interest in the phenomenon of ‘weak states’, understood as entities that are eroded from above (by globalization) and below (by communal, regional, or civil society power) (Gjerdåker et al., 1994). Weak states are also understood in relation to changing notions of sovereignty, which is increasingly seen as a divisible and partial attribute. In this perspective the state appears as a shell-like entity, both undermined and propped up by transnational forces (Jackson, 1990; Krasner, 2001). In a development perspective, weak states can also be seen as countries with low institutional capacity and a legitimacy deficit (Zartman, 1995). The related concept of failed states became central among both academics and policy-makers in the 1990s, and attempts were made to identify the attributes of such states so as to predict their occurrence (Esty et al., 1998; King and Zeng, 2001). Both weak and failed states remain widely used but imprecise analytical categories.

Concepts of weak and failed states need to be refined in relation to dimensions of development and conflict. What kinds of weak and failed states – in institutional, economic, or political terms – are most likely to experience violence? And what kind of violence is most likely, e.g. anarchic or repressive? Are the underlying causes of weak and failing states to be found in the domestic development of the country, in the international strategic context, or in a globalized international political economy?

The transition from a command economy to a market economy has involved considerable instability and violence, in particular in former Yugoslavia and in parts of the former Soviet Union. While these transitions are now mostly over, they have great theoretical significance by providing a virtual laboratory of variations of societal transitions. For instance, in cases associated with great violence, notably Yugoslavia, economic reform and identity factors interacted to intensify contestation over control of the state, which ended in a war over the nature of the state itself (e.g. Woodward, 1995; Kaldor, 2001).

Studies of past transformation of socialist systems can enhance our understanding of societal transformations more generally, and the threshold of violence within different kinds of systems in response to externally induced change. Such studies will also be relevant in relation to cases where the change towards a market economy is gathering momentum, but the political system remains highly controlled (China and Vietnam).

Transitions involving economic reforms based on stabilization and structural adjustment, typically involve fiscal stringency and market liberalization. This may be part of a broader globalization process but there is a significant and separate literature on this theme. Much of the literature on Africa finds reform has had negative socio-economic consequences, especially in the short run and regarding distributive aspects such as increased relative deprivation, inequality, and growing pockets of poverty and marginalization (SAPRIN, 2002). From the 1980s and onward, indebtedness and external demands also produced a long-term weakening of the state and typically made it unable to provide effective services or maintain politically supportive coalitions. In other cases, the virtual permanent crisis created neo-patrimonial states (van de Walle, 2001). The neo-Marxist literature on Africa see consequences in terms of destabilization and social unrest as well (Abrahamsen, 2000). However, this literature on economic adjustment rarely examines the further connection between reform and violence. The exceptions to the rule (Uvin 1998 on Rwanda; Young, 2002 on region-wide trends; Brautigam et al. 2002 on Zimbabwe) show that such reform can have severe conflict potential.

More research is needed on the conflictual consequences of externally-induced economic reforms in developing countries. Particularly important are complex conflict dynamics of a conjunctural nature, i.e. where economic change interacts with other developments to produce violence. From a policy perspective, such research can help

inform international institutions and donors how fiscal and economic reform can be promoted without increasing the likelihood of violent conflict.

Political transitions – including the process of democratization – are likely to entail instability and potentially violent conflict, according to some studies (Huntington 1968; Reagan and Henderson 2002). Political change will encourage mobilization that cannot easily be accommodated by existing institutions, leaving the stage open for anarchical violence, riots, etc. Opening up the political process may also provoke regressive violence from forces that fear they cannot compete in the political process, including hard-line political minorities, religious fundamentalists, or armed elements. Democratization may enable ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize supporters antagonistically along ethnic lines. Under such conditions elections can be quite divisive. On the other hand, the recent drive to establish institutions of democratic pluralism in Africa has not been associated with excess mobilization and related violence. Rather, indifference and low participation rates seem to prevail (van de Walle, 2001; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000).

Insofar as democracies are internally more peaceful than non-democratic states, it is also important from a conflict perspective to understand the conditions under which democratization is likely to take hold and succeed. Early versions of modernization theory held that democracy required a certain level of economic development; countries could not democratize until they had become more economically developed (Lipset, 1959; Huntington and Nelson, 1976). This has been contradicted by recent empirical research, which concludes that ‘[d]emocracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their goals, and it can be initiated at any level of development’ (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 177). Once it is established, the survival chances of democracies improve with economic growth, but ‘[if] they succeed in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations’. This conclusion is supported by some case study material. In the Arab world, for instance, it is the poorer, not the richer Arab countries that have taken steps towards democracy (Sadiki, 2000).

Ethnic divisions can serve as a link that tie democratization and market liberalization to violent conflict. Economic liberalization may concentrate economic power in the hands of an ethnic minority, while political liberalization simultaneously places political power in the hands of the ethnic majority. This can create the conditions for political violence (Chua, 2003). The current violence in Venezuela is a case in point, suggesting a dynamic that is familiar from earlier periods in Southeast Asia (Golay, 1969).

In sum, the nature and consequences of the democratization processes with respect to the potential for violence remain poorly understood and open to conflicting theories. Recent research has unearthed several puzzles of conventional theory that need to be examined further. In particular, under what circumstances is democratization likely to produce less/more violence? Under what the conditions is democratization likely to proceed at all? When is ethnic division a catalyst of violence during a political transition? What strategies are relevant for conflict-reduction during transitions of this kind?

Transitions towards development frequently entail more deep-seated change that affects traditional values and social structures.. The tensions of modernization, as noted above, may stimulate radical fundamentalist and militant responses. Such tension is a common explanation for contemporary militant, Islamist movements. However, as Moaddel (2002) points out, there are several competing theories. The Islamist revival can be understood as a response to various forms of economic, political and cultural crisis. In particular, the failure of repressive governments to translate resource wealth into welfare for the population is an

important factor in several Middle Eastern states (Knudsen, 2003). The sources of militancy and Islamic terrorism has thus been explained by psychological factors (pathology, deprivation), societal conditions (economy, governance), or the nature of the state (sponsorship, hegemony, failed states) (Lia and Skjølberg, 2000). Several writers note the need for a better understanding of the underlying causes of the Islamic revival, as well as extreme violence perpetrated in the name of religion (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Martinez, 2000).

In another theoretical tradition, Max Weber saw the modernization process as progressive rationalization on the level of both state and society. In this perspective, modernization entails a reduction of the saliency of ethnic divisions as primordial identities are replaced by modern achievement-oriented criteria of identity. By this logic, ethnic conflicts would be reduced with the progress of modernization. Some scholars claim, by contrast, that the post-Cold War world is increasingly divided by ethnic lines that ultimately involve a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). Other contemporary scholars follow in the Weberian tradition; they see ethnic conflict as being on the wane (Mueller, 2000) or merely as a 'constructed identity' that enables political entrepreneurs or rebels to mobilize followers for their own agendas (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Hutchinson, 2000, 2001; Malkki, 1995; Oberschall, 2000).

The question is increasingly asked as well whether the modernization process constrains or, rather, aggravates customary forms of social violence as suggested by case studies from e.g., Ethiopia (Abbink, 1998) and Albania (Bozgo et al., 2002). In most situations modernization has been accompanied by the proliferation of small arms, which clearly increases the propensity for conflict at the local and regional level (Mirzeler and Young, 2000).

Contemporary, violent manifestations of ethnicity and militant movements based on religious revivalism require urgent, systematic, and dispassionate research. In particular, it is essential to examine when, and under what conditions, developmental change will modify such violence, and when it is likely to exacerbate it. From a policy perspective, this research is relevant to a range of issues involving Western responses to militant Islam, including the role of aid and good governance to address underlying causes.

(ii) Underdevelopment as a cause of conflict

As noted above, there is widespread agreement that conflict is much more likely to take place in poor countries. Why this is so, remains hotly contested (Gleditsch, 2002). In economic terms, a grievance explanation sees armed conflict as a rebellion of the poor against the rich, with the aim of redistribution. The target may be the domestic elite, multinational corporations, and semi-colonial structures. The grievance perspective on civil war was especially prominent in the neo-Marxist literature in the 1970s, but was understood in terms of political economy, where inequalities of economic, social and political power were inextricably linked.

A sharply opposing perspective relies on economic opportunity analysis to explain the incidence of civil war in poor countries. Here, the motive force for rebellion is greed, that is, the economic opportunity for rebel movements to engage in looting of national resources. The lower the income of the country, the more manpower available for recruitment to the rebels. If the country has valuable natural resources, looting is all the more profitable. Also, in poor countries, the government has a smaller tax base and can set up an efficient central administration, including police and security forces. Valuable natural resources can boost the repressive machinery. If the resources can be exploited by both sides, there is a potential for an enduring conflict (Collier, 2000; Berdal and Malone, 2000). Such wars are sometimes

labeled new wars, and the opportunity structures for rebel support have changed over time (Jean, 1996). The pattern of warfare is by no means new, however (Kaldor, 2001: Kalyvas, 2001).

The grievance vs. opportunity schools of thought on conflict relate to a much wider distinction between radical and liberal views of the consequences of economic development. In the radical view, economic growth frequently increases inequality, in turn causing grievance and conflict. For liberals, economic development entails modernization, literacy, education, and adoption of modern values.

The two perspectives are not completely contradictory. A rebel group may have a strong commitment to redistribution, at least initially. But in order to fund its activities it may have to resort to looting and extortion. There is hardly any rebel movement that has not at some point been accused of criminal activities.

The liberal and radical perspectives on why poverty is related to conflict have very different policy implications. The liberal view emphasizes the importance of economic and political modernization coupled with building a monopoly of power for the government. The radical view advocates redistribution and political change.

Further exploring the radical and liberal views on poverty and conflict will help clarify the causal dynamic between the two. The aggregate relationship between poverty and conflict masks numerous internal variations and national paths. The next essential step is to identify the various conflict dynamics involved, and the conditions as well as strategies that serve to modify or exacerbate conflict. In this respect, it is particularly important to understand to what extent poverty is associated with political dimensions of underdevelopment that are related to violent conflict in their own right, such as a weak or repressive state, and lack of institutions to present grievances or protect individual or group rights. Disentangling these various paths of violence is especially important from a policy perspective which calls for strategies to reduce armed conflict in the development process.

A policy area of great interest to Norway is how development strategies impact on internal conflict. The liberal model suggests that development aid will stimulate economic development and democratization and (in the long run) reduce conflict. However, aid can also be diverted to military build-ups and repressive measures, and may stimulate conflict as well. Overall, the modalities of aid are typically more important in this respect than the volume (Muscat 2002; Ofstad, 2002). Official transfers are small relative to transfers of other conflict-related resources (e.g. trade, investment, military assistance, humanitarian assistance). Yet, they can have an important effect on an evolving conflict, e.g. by freeing the government to release other funds for war-purposes (Sri Lanka), by supporting development priorities that affect tension among competing political forces (East-West Pakistan), or by imposing conditionalities related to conflict prevention or conflict reduction (Zimbabwe). The role of sanctions and conditionalities is of particular interest in this respect (Tostensen and Bull, 2002; Selbervik, 1999).

A growing interest among OECD governments in conflict prevention during the second half of the 1990s has stimulated considerable work in this area. Most of these studies are descriptive and prescriptive, with limited explanatory or predictive value (e.g. OECD/DAC, 1999).

Research on the role of aid in preventing or enhancing violent conflict should be carried forward by drawing on the literature on institutional development, development assistance and conflict. This will enhance the theoretical and policy relevance of such work.

Given the continuing incidence of armed intervention, it is important to understand the dynamic of why highly developed and democratic states go to war or otherwise become involved in international armed conflicts, and how this is related to development factors in both the intervening and the intervened state. Apart from earlier work on imperialist reasons for intervention, some recent work views humanitarian assistance and intervention as part of a global system of uneven development (Duffield, 2001). Despite the theoretical and intuitive links, recent studies on interventionism from the 1990s have rarely raised issues in relation to development. Rather, most studies have focused on the states' position in the international system, and on the rationale for intervention and its consequences.

Research on the role of development factors in the causes of the armed interventions and interventionist wars of the 1990s and beyond would fill a gap in the literature and have clear policy relevance.

(iii) The developmental costs of conflict

Civil war has been characterized as 'development in reverse' (World Bank, 2003). Civil war has enormous economic costs resulting from the destruction of human and financial capital. Economic growth is slower after a civil war. Military expenditure tends to rise, diverting resources from more constructive purposes. Large population displacements, disease and disabilities usually follow in the wake of civil war, and can have long-term consequences. The absence of security and predictability in post-conflict societies can obstruct accumulation of assets, development of stable social relations, and institution-building. Recently ended conflict often is associated with great uncertainty as to whether conflict will resume, particularly if underlying security dilemmas have not been addressed (Walter, 2002). The legacy of conflict typically discourages investors and generates aid dependency. Small arms abound, which encourage criminal activities, sometimes combined with demobilized soldiers who are not reintegrated.

A political economy of war typically carries over into the first phases of peace, as seen e.g. in Afghanistan (Suhrke et al., 2002). This typically entails distorted forms of social and economic life, such as illicit production and trade in diamonds, weapons, and drugs and other valuables, extortion, and even looting of civilians. Such activities may sustain structures of warlordism, mafias and similar institutions, as well as corruption. A political economy of conflict diverges quite drastically from the kind of economy that encourages sound economic development. Resources are removed from growth-generating efforts such as health care and education. There is generally less production and more looting.

The question of post-conflict development should be given higher priority in Norwegian development research. Such research should focus on the political as well economic consequences of conflict, including how post-war reconstruction can be undertaken in a way that facilitates sustainable development rather than aid dependency.

(iv) Conflict as a catalyst for development and peacebuilding

In the age of imperialism, the rationale for expansion typically had a strong developmental aspect in terms of a modernizing and civilizing mission. At the present time, some of the armed interventions have likewise had a developmental rationale in a broad sense: establishing self-determination and human rights in Kosovo and East Timor; democratic pluralism in the former Yugoslavia, modernizing and democratizing the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The key question in this context is whether, and under what kinds of conditions, interventionist wars actually function as a catalyst of subsequent development. There is by now a substantial case-specific material on post-conflict developments that can be harnessed for broader analysis of this kind. There is a large gray literature of commissioned evaluations (e.g. King's College, 2003), as well as a more theoretical literature on peacebuilding. As the latter literature establishes, the degree of success in peacebuilding depends heavily on the conflict that preceded it, as well as the nature of the settlement.

Systematic research is needed on the question of whether, and under what kinds of conditions, wars and armed interventions actually function as a catalyst of subsequent development. Sufficient time has now elapsed to address the question with regard to the armed conflicts in the Third World during the Cold War. There is sufficient data to undertake preliminary assessment regarding the developmental consequences of the interventionist wars in the 1990s and beyond.

More generally, violent conflict can serve as a catalyst of development by removing structural obstacles to change and by opening up for post-war development. In the contemporary period, this has typically been associated with peace settlements and peacebuilding strategies in parts of the developing world that experienced severe wars in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. in Central America, southern Africa, Southeast Asia). Sufficient time has now passed since the peace settlement to assess the nature of the post-war development and its causes, including the role of the previous conflict. As in the case of interventionist wars, there is here a substantial case-specific literature, which can be utilized for a comparative, analytical approach.

Systematic research is needed on the question of whether, and under what kinds of conditions, wars and military intervention actually function as a catalyst of subsequent development.

Peacebuilding appeared as a central research area in the 1990s, largely as a result of demand by policy makers for policy-relevant knowledge in helping to rebuild societies after war and other conflicts. Peacebuilding in this sense is usually understood as a transitional activity designed to prevent the recurrence of past violent conflict and to lay the foundation for (re)building political, economic and social systems that in the longer run will prevent new wars. The key policy issues and related research have focused on 'how to' questions, notably how to ensure that donor-financed recovery encourages sustainable economic growth rather than enduring dependency, how to (re)start democratic processes and institution-building that will sustain the peace, how to undertake effective security sector reform, how to provide order and justice in war-torn societies, and how to address grievances of the past (transitional justice).

Much of the literature in this area has been tailored to specific cases and is quite applied. Increasingly, however, efforts have been made to aggregate and compare data based on several cases, both using both comparative historical analysis (Cousens et al., 2001; Hampson, 1996; Stedman, 2001; Suhrke et al., 2002; Woodward, 2002), and quantitative methods (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

Research on peacebuilding has immediate policy relevance. Many of the 'how to' questions depend on an understanding of causal mechanisms that are addressed in the broader literature on economic development, institution building, and democratization, as well as the conflict-specific literature.

Future research on peacebuilding could be enriched by drawing upon the more theoretical literature. A second-generation literature should be able to provide more systematic answers as to what types of conditions are required for producing the desired

effect in different policy sectors, in different kinds of societies, emerging from different kinds of conflicts, and situated in different kinds of regional/international contexts.

A related literature concerns the international institutions involved in peacebuilding, particularly the United Nations. A case-study literature is emerging in this area, focusing on the role of particular UN agencies or on UN operations in certain kinds of post-conflict contexts. Certain analytical themes have been stressed as well, e.g. the UN's role in peacebuilding for conflict prevention (IPA, 2002), and organizational learning in the UN system.

Research on the role of international institutions in peacebuilding is a growth area of immediate relevance to policy. Given the data available, there are now opportunities to move forward with systematic research in this area.

* * * * *

Two challenges cut across the priority areas of research identified above. The upsurge of research on violent conflict in the 1990s has created a *challenge of methodology*. The deep divisions in the field over the conflicting findings relate in part to different methodological approaches, but also to differences among discipline-based approaches (Mack, 2002). The situation calls for research that can refine, reject, or reconcile these findings by drawing on multiple approaches and the insight from different disciplines. For instance, statistical relationships between indicators of development and conflict can be explored through qualitative analysis using case studies to identify causal dynamics. Ethnographic and anthropological research on motivation of fighters and reconciliation can be used to enrich research on patterns of violence based on structural or rational actor models (Schafer, 2001; Kalyvas, 2001; Gates, 2002).

There is a related *challenge of generating policy-relevant knowledge*. Much of the qualitative literature is case-specific and has limited applicability, while findings based on quantitative methods are probabilistic and hence have limited applicability to particular policy issues. The challenge is to refine knowledge generated by both methods and translate it into an intermediate level of theory that has greater applicability to policy.

5. Current research in Norwegian institutions in this area

In an early phase of preparing this report, a number of Norwegian research institutions were invited to report back on research priorities, current relevant work and general competence in the area of development and conflict. Only a few replied, however. Some reported no relevant research. Aside from CMI and PRIO, Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) voiced a great interest in this research area and reported competence on several relevant issues. SUM stressed the need for methodological pluralism, regional perspectives, rights-based approaches, and research focusing on the beneficiaries of conflict. NUPI is engaged in relevant research on the conditions for establishing effective states, and of interventions as a means to achieve this. They also hold competence in the fields of corruption, peacekeeping operations, and development aid.

Several university departments and research institutes in economics have dealt extensively with development issues, but rarely relating their work to conflict. Recently, however, economists at the University of Oslo and NTNU have contributed to the literature on the economics of conflict (Mehlum et al., 2002).

At the Research Council of Norway most research on conflict has been supported under discipline-based research, notably in political science. Although much of its research support is channeled through thematic research programs, few such programs have been concerned with conflict. Currently, the Council's Division for Environment and Development (MU) has two relevant research programs, both funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One is on 'The multilateral system in the field of development', and the other and much larger program on 'Globalization and marginalization: Roads to development in the South'. PRIO, CMI, and other institutions have obtained funding for conflict-related projects under these programs.

At CMI, development and human rights are core research areas. CMI has an interdisciplinary research community that reflects the broad reach of the theme conflict and development. Relevant research foci of long-standing are (i) the causes and conditions of poverty, including poverty alleviation, (ii) strategies, impact and consequences of economic liberalization reforms in developing countries, (iii) economic development cooperation, including conditionality, (iv) political development in the form of democratic transitions, democratic consolidation, and good governance in Africa. The latter topic is organized through the program 'Political institutions in Africa' (POLINAF). More recently, corruption has emerged a major research field and CMI hosts the web-based *Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre* (www.U4.no).

The causes and alleviation of human rights violations, and humanitarian emergencies and responses constitute major research fields at CMI. The role of humanitarian and development assistance to countries in protracted crisis and post-crisis transitions has been the principal focus of the institute program called *Aid on Conflict*. In a related area, the role of reforms in the legal sector to promote domestic justice and peace after violent conflict has been explored through an interdisciplinary and inter-institutional program based at CMI, called *Courts in Transition*.

At PRIO, there is a particularly long tradition in studying violent conflict, internally as well as between states. In recent years, PRIO has contributed to the international academic debate over the relationships between political institutions, political change and conflict behavior. Increasingly, this perspective has broadened to include studies of the interactions between economic and political development. Future research will also focus on disentangling the impact on conflict of various institutional traits. Other ongoing research projects investigate how conflict is related to economic globalization, inequality between ethnic and religious groups, resource abundance, and resource scarcity. The collection of data on small arms transfers (NISAT) provides opportunities for studies of the impact of small arms availability on recurrence of conflict and opportunities for economic, political and social development in post-conflict societies. Much relevant research at PRIO involves quantitative methods, but comparative case studies also contribute important insight. Much of the relevant work at PRIO is now in the process of being integrated into the new Centre for the Study of Civil War (www.prio.no/cscw), one of Norway's thirteen Centres of Excellence.

CMI and PRIO are complementary in research on development and conflict. The main interests of the two institutions are development and peace research respectively, but much cross-cutting work already exists. Together, the two institutions are engaged in research relevant to all the four perspectives discussed above. Furthermore, the staff involved in relevant projects is collectively inter- and cross-disciplinary and thus represent methodological pluralism. Being able to draw on a great variety of foundational literature,

empirical research, and different methodologies, the two research institutes are well positioned to address together puzzles, challenges, and the substantive frontiers of research identified here.

6. References

- Abbink, J. 1998. Ritual and Political Forms of Violent Practice among the Suri of Southern Ethiopia, *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 38(150-52): 271–295.
- Abrahamsen, R. 2000. *Disciplining Democracy*. London: Zed.
- Anderson, D. 2001. *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
- Berdal, M. R. and D. M. Malone, Editors, 2000. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bozgo, S., X. Sinakoli, and E. Spahia. 2002. Customary Law, Conflict, and Development in the Mountains of Albania, *Mountain Research and Development* 22(4): 341–343.
- Brautigam, D., L. Rakner, and S. Taylor. 2002. Business Associations and Growth Coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40(4): 519–547.
- Chandler, D. 2002. *From Kosovo to Kabul*. London: Pluto Press.
- Chua, A. 2003. *World on Fire. How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Hatred and Global Instability*. New York: Doubleday.
- Collier, P. 2000. *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*. Washington, DC: Development Research Group, The World Bank, www.econ.worldbank.org/files/13198_EcCausesPolicy.pdf.
- Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler. 2001. *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. Washington, DC: Development Research Group, The World Bank, www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf.
- Cousens, E.M., C. Kumar with K. Wermester, Editors. 2001. *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- de Soysa, I. 2002a. Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99, *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 395–416.
- de Soysa, I. 2002b. Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie, or Honey Pot? *Global Environmental Politics* 2(4): 1–27.
- Duffield, M. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed.
- Esty, D.C. et al. 1998. The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning, in J. L. Davies & T. R. Gurr, Editors, *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Boulder, CO & Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield (ch. 3).
- Doyle, M. W. and N. Sambanis. 2000. International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779–801.
- Gates, S. 2002. Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 111–130.
- Gates, S., T. L. Knutsen, and J.W. Moses. 1996. Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View, *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 1–10.

- Giddens, A. 1992 [1985]. *The Nation-State and Violence*. Berkeley, Calif. University of California Press.
- Gjerdåker, S., T. Skålnes, and T. Tvedt, Editors. 1994. *Nasjonalstaten under press?* Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute & Oslo: Cappelen.
- Gleditsch, N. P. 2002. *The Future of Armed Conflict*. Annual Madame Madeleine Feher European Scholar-in-Residence Lecture (6). Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University.
- Gleditsch, N. P., L. Brock, T. Homer-Dixon, R. Perelet, and E. Vlachos, Editors. 1997. *Conflict and the Environment*. NATO ASI Series 2, Environment 33. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- Gleditsch, N. P. and H. Hegre. 1997. Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of Analysis, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(2): 283–310.
- Gleditsch, N.P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. 2002. Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset, *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–637.
- Golay, Frank H. 1969. *Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Gurr, T. R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gurr, T. R., F. Moshiri, and J. A. Goldstone, Editors. 1991. *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Hampson, F. O. 1996. *Nurturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Hauge, W., 2002. *Causes and Dynamics of Conflict Escalation: The Role of Economic Development and Environmental Change. A Comparative Study of Bangladesh, Guatemala, Haiti, Madagascar, Senegal and Tunisia*. Dissertation for the Dr.polit. degree submitted to the University of Oslo.
- Hauge, W. and T. Ellingsen. 1998. Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict, *Journal of Peace Research* 35(3): 299–317.
- Hegre, H., T. Ellingsen, S. Gates & N. P. Gleditsch. 2001. Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992, *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 17–33.
- Hegre, H., R. Gissinger and N. P. Gleditsch. 2003. Globalization and Domestic Armed Conflict, in G. Schneider, K. Barbieri, and N. P. Gleditsch, Editors, *Globalization and Armed Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, in press.
- Homer–Dixon, T. F. 1999. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Huntington, S. P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Huntington, S. P. and J. M. Nelson. 1976. *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hutchinson, J. 2000. Ethnicity and Modern Nations, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(4): 651–669.
- Hutchinson, S. E. 2001. A Curse from God? Religious and Political Dimensions of the Post-1991 Rise of Ethnic Violence in South Sudan, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39(2): 307–331.
- IPA. 2002. *Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors?*, Workshop report. New York: International Peace Academy.

- Jackson, R. H. 1990. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jean, F. and J-C. Rufin, Editors. 1996. *Economie des guerres civiles*. Paris: Hachette.
- Juergensmeyer, M. 2000. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kaldor, M. 2001. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kalyvas, S. N. 2001. 'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars – A Valid Distinction? *World Politics* 54(1): 99–118.
- King, G. and L. Zeng. 2001. Improving Forecasts of State Failure, *World Politics* 53 (4): 623–658.
- King's College. 2003. A Case for Change: A Review of UN Peace Operations. London: King's College.
- Knudsen, A. 2003. Political Islam in the Middle East. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, *Report R* 2003: 3.
- Krasner, S. D. 2001. *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Le Billon, P. 2001. The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, *Political Geography* 20(5): 561–584.
- Lia, B. and K. H.–W. Skjølberg. 2000. Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism. Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), *Report* 02769, www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00004/Lia-R-2000-02769_4938a.pdf.
- Lichbach, M. I. 1989. An Evaluation of Does-Economic-Inequality-Breed-Political-Conflict Studies, *World Politics* 41(4): 431–470.
- Lipset, S. M. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, *American Political Science Review* 53(1): 69–105.
- Mack, A. 2002. Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community, *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 515–525.
- Malkki, L. H. 1995. *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Margold, J. A. 1999. From 'Cultures of Fear and Terror' to the Normalization of Violence: An Ethnographic Case, *Critique of Anthropology* 19(1): 63–88.
- Marshall, M. G. and T. R. Gurr, with J. Wilkenfeld, M. I. Lichbach and D. Quinn. 2003. *Peace and Conflict 2003. A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*. College Park, MD: Center for International Development & Conflict Management, University of Maryland, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/pc03web.pdf>.
- Martinez, L. 2000. *The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998*. London: Hurst.
- Mehlum, H., K. O. Moene, and R. Torvik. 2002. Plunder & Protection, Inc, *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 447–459.
- Mirzeler, M. and C. Young. 2000. Pastoral Politics in the Northeast Periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as Change Agent, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(3): 407–429.
- Moaddel, M. 2002. The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment, *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 359–386.
- Moore, B. 1967. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. London: Penguin.
- Mueller, J. 2000. The Banality of 'Ethnic War', *International Security* 25(1): 42–70.

- Murray, C.J.L, G. King, A.D. Lopez, N. Tomijima and E.G. Krug. 2002. Armed Conflict as a Public Health Problem, *British Medical Journal* 324(7333): 346-349.
- Muscat, R. J. 2002. *Investing in Peace: How Development Aid Can Prevent or Promote Conflict*. Armonk, NY: Sharpe.
- Nafziger, E.W. and J. Auvinen. 2002. Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence, *World Development* 30(2): 153–163.
- Newbury, C. 1988. *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860–1960*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Oberschall, A. 2000. The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(6): 982–1001.
- OECD/DAC. 1999. Development Assistance Committee, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. Paris, September.
- Ofstad, A. 2002. Countries in Violent Conflict and Aid Strategies: The Case of Sri Lanka, *World Development* 30(2): 165–180.
- Ottaway, M.S. and T. Carothers. 2000. *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi. 1997. Modernization – Theories and Facts, *World Politics* 49(2): 155–183.
- Paige, J. M. 1975. *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*. New York: Free Press.
- Ravlo, H., N. P. Gleditsch, and H. Dorussen. 2003. Colonial War and the Democratic Peace, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(4), in press.
- Regan, P. M. and E. A. Henderson. 2002. Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?, *Third World Quarterly* 23(1): 119–136.
- Ross, M. L. 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, *World Politics*, 53(3): 325–361.
- Russett, B. M. and J. R. Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: Norton.
- Sachs, J. D. and A. M. Warner. 2001. The Curse of Natural Resources, *European Economic Review* 45(4–6): 827–838.
- Sadiki, L. 2000. Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32(1): 71–95.
- Sambanis, N. 2002. A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War, *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(3): 215–243.
- SAPRIN. 2002. *The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis and Poverty*. Washington, DC, www.saprin.org
- Schafer, J. 2001. Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-socialization or Re-socialization?, *African Affairs* 100(399): 215–237.
- Schreiber, W., Editor. 2002. *Das Kriegsgeschehen 2001. Daten und Tendenzen der Kriege und bewaffneten Konflikte*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, for Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, Universität Hamburg.
- Scott, J. C. 1976. *Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in South East Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. C. 1998. *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Selbervik, H. 1999. *Aid and Conditionality. The Role of the Bilateral Donor: A Case Study of the Norwegian-Tanzanian Aid Relationship*. Chr. Michelsens Institutt. Report prepared for and published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo.
- Skocpol, T. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stedman, S. J. 2001. International Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Findings from a Study of Sixteen Cases, in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall, Editors, *Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press (737–752).
- Stewart, F. 1998. The Roots of Conflict: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper presented at ‘Policy Conference on Preventing Humanitarian Emergencies Through Development Policies’, Stockholm, 15–16 June 1998, organized by UNI/WIDER and Sida.
- Stewart, F. and V. Fitzgerald. 2001. *War and Underdevelopment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Vols. I, II).
- Suhrke, A., et al. 2002. *A Decade of Peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan*. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
- Tilly, C. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Skocpol, T., P. B. Evans, and D. Rueschemeyer, Editors, *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (169–192).
- Tostensen, A. and B. Bull. 2002. Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? *World Politics* 54(3): 373–403.
- Uvin, P. 1998. *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press.
- Young, C. 2002. Deciphering Disorder in Africa. Is Identity the Key?, *World Politics* 54 (4): 532–557.
- Van de Walle, N. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walter, B. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Wolf, E. R. 1969. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Woodward, S. L. 1995. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Woodward, S. L. 2002. Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation. *Policy Paper series*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- World Bank. 2003. Civil War and Development Policy. *Policy Research Report*. World Bank, draft 7 February, <http://econ.worldbank.org/prr/CivilWarPRR/text-24322/>.
- Zimmermann, W. 2002. *First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.
- Zolberg, A. R., A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo. 1989. *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press.